Expiring New START Treaty

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is the last nuclear weapons control treaty between the U.S. and Russia. It is due to expire today. Russia and the U.S. together own 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. In a context of tensions with Russia, many fear an arms race could resume. Let’s explore the history of nuclear control treaties and what can be expected next.

U.S.-Russia nuclear weapons control treaties over time

In the 70’s, the first treaties between the U.S. and the USSR were signed. They aimed to cap systems, not warheads. The SALT I and II treaties limited strategic launchers. The latter was never ratified by the U.S. senate but was still informally respected.

In 1987, the INF treaty eliminated all land base missiles with ranges from 500 to 5500 km. It was the first treaty to abolish an entire category of arms. This treaty expired in 2019.

The first version of the START treaty was signed in 1991. It aimed to reduce the arsenals to 6 thousand warheads and 1,6 thousand intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers. It also added very intrusive inspections. This treaty expired in 2009. It was replaced by the new START a year later.

The SORT treaty was signed in 2002. Both states agreed to limit their arsenal between 1700 and 2200 deployed warheads. But this treaty was legally weak. There was no solid verification system. It expired in 2012.

What were the terms of the New Start Treaty?

The New START was signed in 2010. It was valid for ten years. But it included a provision allowing a 5-years extension. This extension already happened in 2021.

The treaty had two key pillars. The first was the limitation of nuclear capacities and the other was transparency.

Limit nuclear capacities. The goal was to cap arsenals, prevent arms race and keep nuclear deterrence predictable. The terms stated that both countries were limited to:

- 1 550 deployed nuclear warheads

- 700 deployed delivery systems (intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, strategic bombers)

- 800 total delivery systems (deployed or non-deployed)

Transparency. This aimed to check each other’s compliance to the above terms. It relied on data exchanges, short notice on-site inspections and notifications mechanisms for deployments and changes. The goal was to reduce the risks of miscalculation.

But since the war in Ukraine, cooperation fell sharply. The inspections activities were frozen. The states rely on intel assessments. Due to the U.S. support to Ukraine, Russia also suspended its participation. They did not officially withdraw thought.

Why it matters?

Without any nuclear arms control treaty, there is a risk of unregulated nuclear competition between the two largest nuclear powers. Both states would be legally free to increase their arsenals. They could increase the number of warheads and deploy more systems. Both sides could feel obliged to expand their arsenals over and over in response to a perceived threat. Not knowing the other side’s capacities will drive them to push their capacities as far as possible to be prepared. This is the principle of an arms race.

What happens next?

For now, neither the U.S. nor Russia seem to be in a rush to sign a new treaty. Plus, they both want to include other countries in a similar treaty. The U.S. wants to include China. Russia wants to include France and England. But these countries refuse to be bound by such a treaty. They claim it is irrelevant as their arsenals are much smaller than that of Russia or the U.S.

Some critics also argue that if a new treaty is signed, it could be a strategic weakness for the U.S. They say that being bound to the limits would prevent the U.S. from responding to China’s nuclear build-up.

But it is important to set the record straight on some assumptions. Should an arms race be renewed, it will not be immediate. There are many constraints coming with the buildup of an arsenal. Whether they are technical, logistical, or financial. It would take at least months or even longer.

It can also often be read in the media that the treaty’s limits were a guardrail to a nuclear catastrophe. Yes, the treaty played a crucial role in limiting these states’ nuclear capacities and avoiding a Cold war-era arms race. But let’s not confuse limiting capacities and preventing a nuclear strike. The treaty never prevented any of the parties from launching an attack. Even a limited thousand warheads could cause unthinkable damages if used. It is the principle of mutual destruction that prevents it from happening. The worrying part is rather more around the lack of notification mechanisms without the treaty ensuring it. Detections of deployments and changes in one another’s nuclear assets could be misinterpreted.

It also did not prevent these states from developing and modernizing their nuclear forces. Russia developed new weapons to overcome the U.S. air defense. Their Poseidon is a new intercontinental nuclear armed and powered undersea torpedo. Their Burevestnik is a nuclear armed and powered cruise missile. Plus, they are both developing long range hypersonic missiles. These missiles are very high-speed, making them harder to shoot down. If a new treaty is negotiated, these new capacities should be added to the terms. But this could cause frictions and delay any potential signature of a new START-like treaty.

Decoding geopolitics isn’t a job. It’s survival.

Joy